Judicial data via CourtListener (Free Law Project). Social links via Wikidata.
Affiliations
District Court, D. Massachusetts — appointed by Jimmy Carter
Party: Democratic →B.B.A., The University of Texas at AustinS.J.D., Harvard University
Decision levers
AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
PurposivismTextualism
The opinion applies the plain conditions of the fluctuating workweek regulation without importing broader equitable or policy considerations. Dooley v. Liberty Mutual Insuran… ↗
Willing to revisit precedentStrong stare decisis
The opinion expressly follows controlling First Circuit authority and treats its own earlier contrary district-court rulings as superseded. Bleau v. Greater Lynn Mental Hea… ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
The opinion enjoins a warrantless DNA collection and invalidates a police reprimand for protected speech, treating government action with constitutional skepticism. United States v. Weikert ↗ Bates v. MacKay ↗
In United States v. Weikert, a defendant on supervised release after convictions for cocaine conspiracy and escape challenged the government's attempt to collect a blood sample for DNA analysis under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act to enter into the CODIS database, arguing it violated the Fourth Amendment absent a warrant or individualized suspicion. The district court granted the defendant's motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the collection and denied the government's request to revoke supervised release. The court found the constitutional question was one of first impression in the First Circuit, determined the defendant showed a likelihood of success on the merits along with irreparable harm, concluded the balance of harms favored the defendant, and held that the public interest supported protecting Fourth Amendment rights.
The case involved plaintiff Chukwuma Azubuko suing MBNA America Bank and Experian Information Solutions after MBNA cancelled his credit cards based on negative credit information from Experian concerning a school loan repayment. The complaint asserted incoherent claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, contract theories like unconscionability, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil rights violations, due process, and other matters, while demanding millions in damages and reinstatement of credit lines. The court dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice, as the claims were deemed vexatious and unfounded—particularly since the plaintiff admitted MBNA correctly cancelled one card—and because the plaintiff had a documented history of frivolous filings that disregarded prior court orders and judicial resources.
The case involved a legal malpractice claim filed by plaintiff Michael Frankston in Massachusetts Superior Court against defendants Brackett B. Denniston III and Dennis M. Perluss, alleging breaches of their duty of care in representing him. Denniston removed the action to federal court, asserting that Perluss did not object, but Perluss's later attempts to consent occurred after the statutory deadline and were not properly directed to the court. Frankston moved to remand, arguing improper removal due to lack of timely consent by all defendants. The court granted the motion to remand, holding that each defendant must independently notify the court of consent within the 30-day period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, and that statements in the removal notice or subsequent filings did not satisfy this requirement. It denied the other pending motions as moot.
This case involved a civil action filed by plaintiff Bleau against defendant Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Association, including a defamation claim. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the defamation claim, finding that the complaint failed to specify the statements at issue or when they were made. The core reasoning clarified that federal courts apply the notice pleading standards of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9 rather than any heightened state-law requirements for defamation claims, as established by First Circuit precedent in Andresen v. Diorio that overruled prior district court decisions to the contrary. The opinion designated this portion for publication to resolve confusion about applicable pleading rules in federal defamation cases.
This case involves multiple parties, including insurance companies Great Northern, CNA, and National Grange, along with the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), Paino Associates, Transcore, and Caliber One Indemnity, arising from disputes over contracts, indemnification, and insurance coverage related to MTA projects. The court addressed numerous motions for summary judgment and related filings concerning the authenticity of contract documents and the parties' respective obligations. It granted MTA's motions for summary judgment against Caliber One and Transcore on key legal issues regarding their duties, denied the opposing cross-motions for summary judgment, and allowed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' direct claims against MTA while keeping MTA in the case for its remaining cross-claims and third-party claims. The rulings turned on interpretations of the contracts and undisputed facts in the record without resolving factual disputes.
This case involves multiple motions for summary judgment in a dispute among insurance companies, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, and contractors including Paino Associates and Transcore, Inc., arising from claims related to liability and indemnification. The court addressed numerous filings concerning whether certain parties were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on issues of coverage and responsibility. It denied Transcore's motions for summary judgment against the plaintiffs and Paino Associates, finding that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact for trial. Various other motions were withdrawn by the parties or denied as moot, including an oral motion to strike unauthenticated expert reports. The decisions emphasized adjudication on the merits over procedural technicalities where evidence supported allowing the claims to proceed.