Morton Aaron Brody

In this case, John and Margaret Hall sued Maine Municipal Employees Health Trust (MMEHT) in state court on behalf of their daughter, alleging breach of contract and violations of Maine’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act after MMEHT terminated speech therapy benefits. MMEHT removed the case to federal court, arguing that the claims were preempted by ERISA because the Trust was an employee benefit plan. The court granted the Halls’ motion to remand, holding that MMEHT qualifies as a governmental plan exempt from ERISA. The reasoning centered on the Trust’s establishment by a municipal association for mostly governmental employers, with only a de minimis number of non-governmental participants, and its governance structure tied to public entities.

healthcarelabor & employmentfederal power

In Bloom v. Crook, plaintiff Annalee Bloom, a former assistant district attorney, alleged sex and religion discrimination by her supervisors and the state of Maine under Title VII and the Maine Human Rights Act after her dismissal. Maine moved to dismiss the claims against it under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing it was not Bloom's employer because district attorneys control hiring, firing, and daily supervision of assistants. The court denied the motion, applying a control-based test from First Circuit precedent that considers factors including authority over compensation, benefits, and employee numbers. It concluded that Maine's role in legislative appropriations for salaries and approvals by the Attorney General and Governor could establish sufficient involvement to make the state an employer at this stage, allowing the case to proceed to discovery.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involved a claim by a student, Jennifer Greenleaf, through her father, that her school's principal violated her Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a search for evidence of alcohol consumption. Following a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the defendant principal, concluding that the search did not violate the Constitution. The decision was based on the search being justified at its inception due to a reliable student informant's report of beer drinking and reasonable suspicion of violations, and reasonable in scope as it was conducted privately with consent, without physical contact, and limited to areas where evidence might be found, per the standards in New Jersey v. T.L.O.

civil rightscriminal law

David Bishop sued his employer, Bell Atlantic, in state court alleging retaliation and discrimination in employment under the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act and Maine Human Rights Act after he reported an alleged assault by his supervisor and filed related charges with the Maine Human Rights Commission. Bell Atlantic removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were preempted by Section 301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act because they implicated a collective bargaining agreement. The court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted it in part and denied it in part. It held that Bishop’s MHRA retaliation claim under 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(E) was not preempted because resolving it did not require interpreting the CBA, while noting that other potential bases for the claim might be analyzed differently. The court retained jurisdiction on diversity grounds even without federal-question jurisdiction over the state-law claim.

labor & employmentcivil rights

Susan Belanger sued her health insurer Healthsource and its mental health benefits administrator CMG after they initially denied coverage for her inpatient psychiatric treatment, leading to her discharge from the hospital; she alleged negligence, breach of contract, unfair trade practices, and ERISA violations. The court dismissed the three state-law claims with prejudice, holding that they were preempted by ERISA as alternative enforcement mechanisms that would frustrate uniform federal administration of employee benefit plans. The ERISA claim was dismissed without prejudice because the complaint failed to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies for unpaid outpatient benefits or that either defendant was the plan administrator subject to penalties for withholding information.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

The case involved parents suing a Maine school district, its interim superintendent, and a principal for failing to investigate multiple reports of a probationary teacher's inappropriate relationships with male high school students, which allegedly enabled the teacher to sexually harass their 15-year-old son after an off-campus incident involving alcohol. Plaintiffs asserted claims under Title IX, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Maine Human Rights Act, and common-law negligence. On the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the § 1983 claims against the individual officials because the harassment did not occur under color of state law and some other claims on preemption or immunity grounds, while allowing certain Title IX and negligence claims to proceed due to disputed facts about whether prior reports should have prompted action that might have prevented the misconduct.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a civil rights lawsuit brought by Carmen Miller and her husband against various law enforcement entities and officers following her arrest on an outstanding warrant for failure to appear and pay a fine. Ms. Miller was stopped for a traffic violation, arrested based on a warrant that had restrictions on execution timing, transported to jail, and subjected to searches, leading to claims of violations under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as state tort laws. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding no genuine issues of material fact and that the officers' actions were based on reasonable interpretations of the warrant information available to them, with no evidence supporting claims of excessive force or improper conduct by identifiable individuals.

criminal lawcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability

In this case, 65-year-old plaintiff Philip Tobin sued University of Maine System officials and law school admissions committee members after being denied admission to the law school, alleging that the denial was based on his age in violation of the Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. The court considered defendants' motion for summary judgment on those two counts. The court granted summary judgment on the Equal Protection claim, finding no genuine issue of material fact because the admissions criteria were age-neutral, plaintiff had the lowest LSAT score among admitted students, and age classifications are subject only to rational basis review with no evidence of discriminatory intent or treatment. The Age Discrimination Act claim was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not filing a complaint with the relevant federal agency. The court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff but concluded that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

civil rightsprocedure

In this diversity case, plaintiff Lilia Twombly sued the Association of Farmworker Opportunity Programs for breach of contract after it allegedly failed to provide adequate health insurance and workers' compensation benefits during her AmeriCorps service, following a car accident. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that the health insurance policy provided met federal standards as it had equivalent fair market value to the minimum benefits required, and that the promise of workers' compensation was unenforceable because federal law preempts state workers' compensation for AmeriCorps participants who are not considered employees.

labor & employmentfederal powerhealthcare

This case involved an application for attorney’s fees by the plaintiff’s counsel after a jury found that a correctional officer violated the due process rights of a pre-trial detainee by placing him in a restraint chair, resulting in a nominal damages award of $1.00. The defendant opposed the fee request under section 1997e(d)(2) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, arguing that the nominal damages constituted a monetary judgment limiting fees to 150 percent of the award. The court granted fees of $3,892.50, ruling that a nominal damages award does not qualify as a monetary judgment triggering the PLRA’s fee cap, as such an interpretation would produce absurd results contrary to congressional intent. The court further held that fees remain subject to the reasonableness and proportionality requirements of section 1997e(d)(1), which align with existing standards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and found the requested amount reasonable given the hours worked and the vindication of constitutional rights.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved J & S Oil suing Irving Oil for alleged predatory price discrimination in violation of federal antitrust statutes (15 U.S.C. § 13(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 45) along with related state claims, asserting that Irving sold gasoline below cost at its retail stations in Kennebec County while charging higher prices elsewhere in order to harm competition. The court granted Irving's motion for summary judgment on the two federal counts, holding that J & S failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on key elements such as injury to competition or the plaintiff itself, and dismissed the remaining state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The core reasoning was that undisputed facts showed J & S continued operating and even opened a new station during the alleged predatory period, with no evidence of lost profits or market exit, and that additional discovery would not cure these deficiencies.

business & regulatory

The case involved the United States suing to recover unpaid balances on two student loans that defendant Kenneth Dwelley executed in 1983 and 1984, defaulted on in 1991, and which were later assigned to the Department of Education. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment after finding no genuine dispute of material fact and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Defendant's late response waived objections, and his affirmative defenses—including lack of subject matter jurisdiction, constitutional due process and takings claims, statute of limitations, laches, and inadequate collection efforts—were rejected because federal student loan collections have no applicable statute of limitations under 20 U.S.C. § 1091a and the other defenses lacked legal or factual support. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the amount of principal, interest, and filing fees.

federal powerprocedure

The case involves Bangor Hydro-Electric Co. suing New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. for failing to pay approximately $295,675 as its share of tree clearance costs incurred after a 1998 ice storm, under theories of breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and equitable contribution based on their 1984 Joint Pole Agreement. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to compel arbitration under Article XV of the agreement and the Federal Arbitration Act. The court treated the motion as one to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, granting it on the grounds that the arbitration clause was unambiguous, applied to the dispute, and governed a contract in interstate commerce.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Harold Parks, former City Manager of Brewer, sued the City and three councilors under Section 1983, claiming that the non-renewal of his employment contract denied him due process and retaliated against his speech criticizing a municipal ordinance on site reviews for commercial land use; he also asserted a claim under the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts. Applying the standard that summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part after viewing the record in the light most favorable to Parks and identifying disputed facts concerning the nature of his speech, any resulting disruption, and the councilors’ motivations.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Philip Tobin, a 65-year-old applicant, who sued University of Maine System officials after being denied admission to the law school, alleging age discrimination and asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of substantive due process and equal protection, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I, III, IV, and V. It reasoned that Tobin failed to allege a protected property interest in admission sufficient for a due process claim, provided insufficient facts for equal protection, did not meet the standards for extreme and outrageous conduct or timely notice under the Maine Tort Claims Act for the emotional distress claim, and did not establish the existence of a contract that would support the good faith claim.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

Plaintiff Pamela Fillion, a non-tribal member, sued the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians and its former chief after her employment termination, claiming race, color, and sex discrimination plus retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Maine Human Rights Act, as well as breach of her employment and settlement contracts, defamation, and tortious interference. The court granted the Band’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim, finding that the tribe is not a state actor and that the complaint failed to allege a deprivation of federal rights. Plaintiff’s motions to amend to add claims under the Indian Civil Rights Act and Title VII were denied as futile because tribal sovereign immunity bars such actions in federal court and Title VII expressly exempts Indian tribes. The remaining supplemental state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

civil rightslabor & employmentfederal power

In this case, white non-Indian plaintiff Judith Boudman sued the Aroostook Band of Micmac Indians, her former employer, alleging that her termination was due to race and national origin in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with claims for breach of contract and denial of due process. The defendant moved to dismiss the discrimination counts for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that its employment decisions were internal tribal matters exempt from suit under the reasoning of Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that unlike the Penobscot Nation and certain other Maine tribes, the Aroostook Band lacks an internal tribal matters exemption from state laws such as the MHRA under the applicable federal and state settlement acts. The court also granted in part the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint and dismissed the due process count. The core reasoning focused on statutory distinctions in how different Maine tribes are treated with respect to the application of state anti-discrimination law.

civil rightslabor & employmentfederal power

The case involved a defamation lawsuit brought by political consultant Robert Norris against Bangor Publishing Co. and journalist John Day over three articles published in the Bangor Daily News that described Norris's work as an opposition researcher in a Maine Senate race. Norris also claimed negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference with business advantage, and sought to hold the publisher liable under respondeat superior. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, primarily analyzing whether Norris qualified as a limited-purpose public figure subject to the actual malice standard for defamation claims and evaluating the truthfulness and context of the challenged statements.

electionsfree speechtorts & liability

This case is a contract dispute in which Plaintiffs, non-profit lenders, sued Defendant for breaching a Registration Agreement requiring SEC registration of stock shares transferred in a corporate acquisition, along with related Purchase and Shareholders’ Agreements tied to loans made to the acquired companies. The court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, while granting summary judgment in part to Defendant on its own motion, and granted Plaintiffs’ motion to strike. The core reasoning was that Plaintiffs were not intended third-party beneficiaries of the Guaranty Payment provision in the Purchase Agreement, the Indemnity Clause in the Registration Agreement did not authorize specific performance such as a share buyback, and Defendant had failed to register the shares as required.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Shannon v. Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, plaintiff Kelli Shannon, a former executive director for the Band, alleged that she was terminated in retaliation for opposing the unlawful treatment of another employee, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Maine Human Rights Act, the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, breach of employment contract, and tortious interference. The Band moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction, while Shannon sought to amend her complaint to add claims under Title VII and the Indian Civil Rights Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion to amend, finding that Shannon had not alleged a deprivation of federal rights under Section 1983, that the proposed Title VII claim was barred by an exemption for Indian tribes, and that the ICRA claim could not proceed in federal court due to tribal sovereignty and the requirement that such claims be brought in tribal forums. The court further noted that state-law claims did not independently support federal jurisdiction in this context.

civil rightslabor & employmentfederal power